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Introduction
In this paper, we investigate compliance with mandatory stock option disclosures of directors and the five most highly remunerated officers for Australian companies in the top 400 for the years 2000 and 2002. We also examine, firstly, whether there is consistent compliance across all categories of required disclosures, including sensitive disclosures, and, secondly, the choice to position these disclosures in the notes to the financial statements as opposed to the directors' report. An impact of this management choice is that the disclosures in the notes to the financial statements are audited, whereas the Directors' Report, which is more likely to be read by users, only needs to be checked by the auditors for consistency with the financial statements.
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Prior research suggests that the format in which information is communicated, for example disclosure in footnotes versus recognition in the income statement or balance sheet, affects the extent to which the information affects users' judgements. It has been suggested (Cotter and Zimmer, 2003; Liang and Zhang, 2006; and Nelson and Taylor, 2007) that disclosure signals to users that the information is less useful.
Additionally, information disclosed in the footnotes is less accessible to users due to the limitations in human information processing (Maines and McDaniel, 2000) . The above research would suggest that the directors' report is more accessible or transparent to users than information in footnotes.
1 AUS 212 requires any 'other information' in the annual report to be reviewed by the auditor to ascertain that the information contained therein is (i) materially consistent with the information provided in the audited financial report and (ii) there is no material misstatement of fact. Examples of 'other information' include the Directors' Report.
Executive remuneration is a controversial topic both in Australia and internationally, in an environment of increasing executive pay and corporate collapses (Hill and Yablon, 2003) . The component of executive pay that has received the most criticism is stock options. For example, the CEO of AMP attracted considerable criticism in 2002 when seeking an extension of his options vesting date (Boyd and Clegg, 2002) . This extension was sought after interim profit slumped 25 percent to $303 million. Due to public outrage, he reversed this decision (Hewitt, 2002 Previous studies have found that in some environments, firms behave towards mandatory requirements as if they are voluntary (Marston and Shrives, 1996; Hope, 2003a) .
Transparent financial statements are statements that "reveal the events, transactions, judgments, and estimates underlying the statements, and their implications" (Pownall and Schipper, 1999, 262) . Morris et al. (2004, 196) state that the disclosure of financial information in company annual reports appears to be a "necessary but not sufficient component of corporate transparency. These authors measure compliance with accounting standards as one important component of the broader concept, corporate transparency. Coulton et al., (2003) demonstrated that a change in accounting regulations increased the level of transparency of CEO compensation disclosures, including stock options over the three year period, 1998 to
2000.
The results of our study reveal that most of the companies disclosed the information in the directors' report, with larger companies and companies in the finance industry more likely to disclose the requirements in the notes to the financial statements, where the disclosures are less visible. Although companies were complaint with most of the statutory requirements on stock options for directors and the five most highly remunerated officers, 43 of the 153 firms in the sample which issued options, did not disclose the value of the options issued and another 27 of the companies disclosed a "Nil" value for the value of options issued. That is, companies
were very secretive about the most sensitive of the required disclosures, the amount (value) of the options issued.
The remaining sections of this paper are as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background. Section 3 reviews previous literature and outlines the research questions. Section 4 outlines the data and research design. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 provides the concluding comments.
Institutional Background
The sections (1) The directors' report for a financial year for a company must also include: (c) details of the nature and amount of each element of the emolument of each director and each of the 5 named officers of the company receiving the highest emolument.
Section s. 300(1)(d) and s. 300 (5) Annual directors' report-specific information
(1) The directors' report for a financial year must include details of: (d) options that are: (i) granted over unissued shares or unissued interests during or since the end of the year; and (ii) granted to any of the directors or any of the 5 most highly remunerated officers of the company; and (iii) granted to them as part of their remuneration;
(5) The details of an option granted are: (a) the company, registered scheme or disclosing entity granting the option; and (b) the name of the person to whom the option is granted; and (c) the number and class of shares or interests over which the option is granted.
Practice Note 68 provides guidance about the amount of emolument (s.300A
(1)(c)) in relation to options. PN 68.60 states that the elements of emoluments to be disclosed would normally include the value of options granted.
Prior literature and research questions
Several studies examining the compliance levels of firms with particular countries' accounting regulations agree that without adequate enforcement of these regulations, firms will not fully comply with the legislation (Hope, 2003a; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994) . In Australia, Coulton et al., (2003) have demonstrated that a change in accounting regulations increased the level of transparency of disclosure. However, Nelson and Percy (2005) The size of a firm can influence the level of disclosures in the companies' annual reports. Larger firms can easily generate detailed information for reporting purposes as they are already using the information for their own reporting purposes.
These firms are more visible to the public and as such are subject to greater public and government pressure to provide more detailed disclosures (Hope, 2003a; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994) . Furthermore, the type of industry can have a strong impact on a company's disclosure practices, for example, industries with a higher level of risk may disclose more information regarding their operations (Hope, 2003c and Dye and Sridhar, 1995) . Research question two follows from the above:
Research Question 2(a): Are larger companies more likely to disclose this information in the notes to the financial statements than in the directors' report?
Research Question 2(b):
Is there an association between the level of disclosures in the directors' report and industry membership?
Data and Research Design
The firms used in this study are selected from the top 400 listed companies using the BRW Top 500 for 2002. To be included in the study, these firms must satisfy the following: The dependent variable is a continuous variable measured as the total of mandatory stock option disclosures made in the directors' report divided by the total overall mandatory stock option disclosures. This study uses a disclosure index based on the requirements contained in the Corporations Law/Act. Six elements of information are identified. These elements require the disclosure of: the nature and amount of the emolument (i.e. stock options), the company (or other entity) granting the options, the names of the people receiving the options and the number and type of shares under option. A score of one is given for each item in the index that is disclosed, and a zero is given where the information is not disclosed. The index is described in Appendix A.
In order to derive an overall score, the total items disclosed are added together.
This number is then divided by the total number of items that should be disclosed.
This provides a final score out of one. For example, if a firm discloses four out of six items of information, the calculation is 4/6, which equals 66.67 percent. This score is the firm's overall compliance score.
Initially the directors' report is examined for the information as the Corporations Law/Act requires these disclosures in the directors' report. However, the legislation allows firms to transfer this information to the notes of the financial report. Therefore, when the information is not located in the directors' report; the notes to the firms' financial report are examined for the remaining information. The amount of information actually disclosed in the directors' report is then noted. That is, out of the six disclosure requirements, how much of this information is disclosed in the directors' report?
The first independent variable, size (LOGASSET), is measured as the log of total assets because of the large difference in the amount of assets, for example $217,671,000,000 as opposed to $7,147,707. Prior research suggests that companies would aim to reduce their political sensitivity by disclosing more information in the notes to the financial statements, which are less visible (Nelson and Tayler (2007) .
This study predicts a negative relationship between size of the firm and percentage of information in the directors' report.
The second independent variable, industry (IND_CODE), is measured by classifying the sample into finance and non-finance using a 0/1 dichotomous variable.
A score of one is awarded to firms that are in the finance industry and a zero is awarded otherwise. The finance industry consists of banks and diversified financials.
5
The finance industry is very much in the public eye. These firms are usually larger and more politically sensitive. It is thought that they will try to reduce their political sensitivity by disclosing more information in the audited notes to the financial statements. This study predicts a negative relationship between industry and percentage of information in the directors' report. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics on each of the components required to be disclosed. Overall, the mean disclosure scores for most items are high, if not 100 percent. However, companies are reluctant to reveal information on the amount (value) of the options issued. The mean (pooled sample) for this item exhibits the lowest disclosure level at 71.86 percent. Firms are the most forthcoming with disclosure on the nature of the emolument and who is granting the options. The mean scores for each of these items is 100 percent. The mean for the total level of compliance with the legislation is 92.38 percent (pooled sample).
Results
In comparing the mean scores between 2000 and 2002, it can be seen that the average level of compliance across all items has increased slightly. However, the lowest mean continues to be the mandated disclosure, the amount (value) of options granted, which is the most sensitive of the required disclosures. The mean for the total level of compliance increased slightly in 2002 (93.13 percent) from 2000 (91.55 percent). Table 2 reports the number of firms at various compliance levels. The firms are broken down in this manner because not all firms are 100 percent compliant with the legislation. It can be seen that out of the total sample of 153 firms, 100 (65 percent) are fully compliant with the legislation.
Place Tables 1 and 2 here.
The analysis of the sensitive component of these mandatory disclosures, the amount (value) of options issued, is reported in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that 43 firms (28.10 percent) in the sample did not disclose the amount (value) of options granted to their directors and the five most highly remunerated officers. However, 110 firms (71.90 percent) did disclose a value but 27 (17.6 percent) of these were a 'Nil' value.
Although overall compliance is very high, companies are secretive about the value of the options issued. Table 4 shows the various percentages of information that firms disclosed in the directors report. It can be seen that 117 (76.47 percent) firms disclose 100 percent of the required disclosures in the directors' report. This result suggests that most firms follow what the legislation dictates and disclose the required information in the directors' report rather than the notes to the financial statements. Table 5 indicates that the items most likely to be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements are the amount (value) of options granted and the class of shares over which options are granted. Perhaps this is because the notes are less visible as compared to the directors' report.
Place Tables 3, 4 and 5 here.
The results of research question 2 (a) and (b) are presented in Tables 6 and 7 with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 6 . The results reported in Table 7 indicate that larger firms (p<0.01) and firms in the finance industry (p<0.05) are more likely to disclose the required information in the notes to the financial statements rather than the directors' report to improve their credibility.
Place Tables 6 and 7 here.
Concluding Comments
We investigate compliance with mandatory stock option disclosures made in the directors' report for the directors and the five most highly remunerated officers of Our results are subject to several limitations. The first limitation is the sample size of firms using options. The size is mainly due to the very selective criteria used in choosing companies to be included, for example, 67 companies were eliminated for having a year end that was not 30 June. Another limitation is in regards to the generalisability of the results. Our study is not specific to any particular industry. Reason for elimination from sample Not using stock options as a form of executive compensation, i. 
